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FIRA: INSTRUMENT OF REGULATION OR
VOTE-MAXIMIZATION?
JACQUES R. PAUWELS*
The establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency can be explained
on the basis that such a "screening instrument" was the most efficient instru-
ment to deal with the problem of foreign direct investment in Canada. However,
Jacques Pauwels argues that FIRA was created not for the efficient regulation
of foreign direct investment but for political purposes; that is, FIRA provided
the Trudeau government with considerable vote-maximizing possibilities. More-
over, Pauwels suggests that Mulroney'sintroduction of the Investment Canada
Act, replacing FIRA with Investment Canada, can similarly be explained.
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision to regulate the flow of foreign direct investment
(FDI) by means of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA)
undoubtedly ranks among the more controversial policies initiated by
the federal government since Pierre Elliott Trudeau became Prime
Minister in 1968. On the one hand, proponents of laissez-faire ideas
and continentalism opposed any form of FDI regulation from the start;
and they continued to condemn FIRA as an obstacle to the free flow of
international capital, which impeded Canada's economic growth. Eco-
nomic nationalists, on the other hand, originally welcomed the decision
to regulate FDI by means of a "screening agency", but FIRA was to
disappoint their expectations and some nationalists eventually dis-
missed the Agency as a useless regulatory "paper tiger". The establish-
ment of FIRA by the Trudeau Cabinet appears to have been a particu-
larly unpopular decision. Why, then, was the decision made to regulate
FDI in such a manner?
In trying to answer such questions, students of public policy pri-
marily use two "models" (or "paradigms") of decision-making in gov-
ernment. The first is the "technical efficiency" or "comprehensive ra-
tionality" model, which postulates that governmental decision-makers
select what they believe (not necessarily correctly) to be the most effi-
cient "instrument" available to solve a policy problem (as they define
it) and, thus, to serve the "public interest". Consequently, when a pol-
0 Copyright, 1985, Jacques R. Pauwels.
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icy instrument fails to achieve its objectives, it is either because imper-
fect information caused the government unwittingly to select an ineffi-
cient instrument or because a potentially efficient policy decision was
not properly implemented.1
The case of FIRA appears to fit the "technical efficiency" para-
digm of public policy making. It could be argued that the Liberal poli-
ticians perceived foreign ownership as a serious policy problem, that
they genuinely believed that "Canadianization" was in the public inter-
est, and that, having explored all other policy options, they decided that
a screening agency was the most technically efficient instrument for
regulating FDI and, thus, reducing foreign ownership. This scenario ac-
counts for the unpopularity of FIRA as follows: the continentalists
were dismayed and embittered by the government's commitment to
what was clearly a policy of economic nationalism; the nationalists ini-
tially welcomed FIRA as a worthwhile "Canadianization" initiative
and had high expectations for it, but were sadly disappointed when the
Agency revealed itself to be a regulatory cipher instead of an efficient
tool for the regulation of FDI. Viewed from this "technical efficiency"
perspective, then, the unsuccessful pursuit of an efficient way to regu-
late FDI explains FIRA's popularity and credibility problems.
The second and competing paradigm of public policy making is
the "Public Choice" approach, which holds that the selection of a gov-
erning instrument is determined not by considerations of efficiency but
by "political rationality". Politicians are said to be "rational" in the
sense that they are motivated by self-interest and, more specifically, by
the desire to be re-elected.2 The "Public Choice" model can undoubt-
edly be used to explain many cases of tax expenditure, regulation and
other forms of public policy. However, the creation of FIRA, a policy
decision which served to alienate, or so it seems, both the continental-
ists and the nationalists within the Canadian electorate, appears to be a
case of federal regulation which defies analysis by means of this theory.
FIRA seems to have been such a hopelessly dysfunctional instrument
for the politicians' "rational" purpose of re-election that the "vote-max-
imizing calculus" of those same politicians cannot possibly be invoked
to explain the Agency's origins.
1 For a summary of the "technical efficiency" model, see Doern & Phidd, Canadian Public
Policy: Ideas, Structure, Process (1983) at 139-41; and Adie & Thomas, Canadian Public Ad-
ministration: Problematical Perspectives (1982) at 96-97.
2 The Public Choice model is summarized in Aucoin, "Public Policy Theory and Analysis" in
Doern & Aucoin, eds., Public Policy in Canada: Organization, Process and Management (1979)
at 7-9; and Doern & Phidd, ibid. at 143-45. For a more elaborate introduction to Public Choice
theory, see Trebilcock et al., The Choice of Governing Instrument (1982).
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Yet, to analyze FIRA from a Public Choice perspective is the pur-
pose of this essay. It will be argued that, contrary to what the seem-
ingly plausible "technical efficiency" view suggests, the Trudeau Cabi-
net of the early 1970s had no desire to regulate FDI, a purpose for
which much more efficient instruments were available; that FIRA was
created as a symbol which was expected to mesmerize the nationalist
masses and, therefore, to help harvest the nationalist vote at the next
electoral opportunity; that the Agency was designed not to control FDI,
but to enable the government to reap the political rewards of catering
to interest groups, either by regulating or by not regulating, whichever
happened to be more politically useful; that, in spite of appearances to
the contrary, FIRA served this politically rational purpose admirably
well until the end of Trudeau's career; and finally, that Brian Mulroney
was too impressed with FIRA's "vote-maximizing" potential to bring
himself to dissolving the Agency altogether - as many expected this
avowed continentalist to do - but restricted himself merely to trans-
forming it into "Investment Canada".
II. WHY REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT?
A. FDI Regulation: For and Against
It is tempting to interpret the establishment of FIRA on Decem-
ber 12, 1973, as a symptom of some hypothetical concern on the part of
the Trudeau Cabinet about the extent of foreign ownership in this
country and a corresponding desire to regulate FDI.3 In reality, how-
ever, Trudeau and his colleagues were not motivated by such considera-
tions. Trudeau was never a genuine nationalist,4 and the Liberal Party
was traditionally the home of free trade in general and continentalism
in particular.5 Moreover, most of those economists who were considered
experts in the field of FDI 6 discounted the alleged dangers of foreign
ownership; they warned instead of the risks associated with policies
which interfered with the free flow of FDI to which Canadians were
3 In contrast to FDI, so-called portfolio investment from abroad is not held to entail foreign
control; it has therefore been left untouched by regulatory efforts such as the creation of FIRA,
which aimed at reducing the degree of foreign control over the Canadian economy.
4 See, e.g., Gwyn, The Northern Magus: Pierre Trudeau and Canadians (1980) at 263; also
Resnick, The Land of Cain: Class and Nationalism in English Canada 1945-1975 (1977) at 147,
who describes Trudeau as "no great admirer of nationalism".
Meisel, "The Party System and the 1974 Election", in Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls:
The General Election of 1974 (1975) 15-16; Laxer, Canada's Economic Strategy (1981) at 12.
0 Notably A. E. Safarian, Harry Johnson and Albert Breton.
1985]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
said to owe at least in part their high standard of living.7 Ottawa was
also aware that much displeasure would be aroused south of the border
should Canada ever institute policies which might be perceived as a
threat to existing or future American investment opportunities in this
country. Finally, powerful Canadian interest groups, particularly in the
business community, opposed all government interference with the free
flow of international capital. Among these interest groups were the "fi-
nance sector", which was said to "profit handsomely by the expansion
of American capital in Canada," and the "industrial bourgeoisie", es-
pecially Canadian managers of multinational enterprises and Canadian
capitalists "whose enterprise depends on foreign-owned . . . operations
in Canada for the greater part of [their] market." 8
For all these reasons, then, the Trudeau Cabinet of the late 1960s
and early 1970s was not eager to do anything at all about foreign own-
ership and investment; its preferred policy option with regard to FDI
was inaction. Inaction, or at most a casual ad hoc approach, which had
characterized the attitude of the Liberal government with respect to
FDI under Lester B. Pearson, simply continued to do so under Tru-
deau. Looking back on the pre-FIRA years of Liberal rule, an observer
was, thus, able to write that "few countries in the world have done so
little about the level of foreign investment within their borders as Can-
ada. . .[and] the emergence of a comprehensive government policy on
foreign investment has been conspicuous by its absence. '
By the end of 1973, however, a "comprehensive government pol-
icy" with regard to FDI - the Foreign Investment Review Act - was
in place. What were the reasons for this sudden break with the Liberal
governments' tradition of inaction and "ad hocery" in the field of for-
7 See, e.g., Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry (1966) and The Performance
of Foreign-Owned Firms in Canada (1969). Johnson's views on FDI are described in Watkins,
"The Economics of Nationalism and the Nationality of Economics: A Critique of Neoclassical
Theorizing" (1978) 11 C.J.E. S91. It is true that nationalist economists competed with Safarian et
al. to influence the policy makers, but the views of the pro-FDI experts appear to have carried
more weight in Ottawa; Trudeau himself was greatly impressed with Breton's unfavourable opin-
ion of nationalist policies, according to Clarkson, "Anti-Nationalism in Canada: The Ideology of
Mainstream Economics" (1977) C.R.S.N. at 61-62.
8 Layton, "Nationalism and the Canadian Bourgeoisie: Contradictions of Dependence" in
Grayson, ed., Class. State, Ideology, and Change: Marxist Perspectives on Canada (1980) at 223.
9 McMillan, "After the Gray Report: The Tortuous Evolution of Foreign Investment Policy"
(1974) 20 McGill L.J. at 213-14, 258. See also Stewart, Divide and Conquer: Canadian Politics
at Work (1973), describing the record of FDI controls of Trudeau's early years in power as "a
wasteland". The totally inadequate manner in which the government still recorded foreign take-
overs as late as 1970, for example, was described as follows: "A black loose-leaf book full of
newspaper clippings is a heck of a way to keep track of takeovers in the world's 'most taken-over
country'." Dewey, "104 Canadian Companies taken over by U.S. in '70" in Innis, ed., Issues for
the Seventies: Americanization (1972) 70.
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eign investment policy? Why did Trudeau take responsibility for a pol-
icy which ran counter to his own better judgment and to the advice of
authoritative economists and, moreover, which seemed certain to alien-
ate powerful Canadian business interests as well as American investors
and their government? The answer can be found by assembling the
pieces of the puzzle of Trudeau's "vote-maximizing calculus" of the
time. His decision to regulate FDI made sense (that is, it was "ra-
tional") from the viewpoint of a politician who, as Public Choice theo-
rists insist, is motivated first and foremost by electoral considerations
and the desire to win re-election.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a comet of nationalism, particu-
larly economic nationalism, that featured a tail of ardent anti-Ameri-
canism, streaked through the firmament of Canadian politics.10 With
the precision of a thermometer, Gallup Polls recorded the rapid rise of
this nationalistic fever. More specifically, they revealed that the Cana-
dian public was becoming increasingly concerned about the issue of
FDI:
[Between 1964 and 1972] the number of Canadians stating that there is enough
U.S. capital invested in Canada had increased from 46 percent to 67 percent;
while in the same period the number of those wanting more U.S. capital had
fallen from 33 percent to 22 percent.1'
The obvious anti-American bias of this eruption of economic xenopho-
bia (as some perceived it) is said to have been caused by non-economic,
"emotional" factors such as opposition to the U.S. role in the Vietnam
War, 12 and President Richard Nixon's introduction of a ten percent
import surcharge which reportedly signalled the end of a thirty year
"special relationship" between the two countries.' 3
In any event, the precise causes of the explosion of Canadian na-
tionalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s are less important in the
context of this study than the fact that Trudeau realized only too well,
as students of his career point out, "that Canadians [had] become a lot
more nationalist economically than they were before."M4 Not only were
the Gallup Polls teaching him this lesson, but the message of economic
10 See e.g., Resnick, supra note 4 at 145; Beigie & Hero, eds., Natural Resources in U.S.-
Canadian Relations, vol. 2 (1980) 606; Dunn, "Canada and its Economic Discontents" (1973) 52
For. Aft. I at 124.
"1 Rugman, Multinationals in Canada: Theory, Performance, and Economic Impact (1980)
at 127; see also Munton & Poel, "Electoral Accountability and Canadian Foreign Policy: the Case
of Foreign Investment" (1977-78) 33 Int'l J. I at 222ff.
12 Perry, "Canadians Waking up to Reality over Foreign Control", The Financial Post (8
Mar. 1980); Dunn, supra note 10 at 124.
" Resnick, supra note 4 at 147; Layton, supra note 8 at 229.
14 Resnick, ibid. at 147; also Gwyn, supra note 4 at 263.
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nationalism also resounded loud and clear on Parliament Hill as nu-
merous politicians, the media and some influential interest groups em-
braced the cause of FDI regulation.
First, among the politicians, articulate nationalists could be found
within the Liberal Party itself. Limited initially to a handful of maver-
icks - such as Walter Gordon, who preached the gospel of economic
nationalism to a party traditionally committed to a continentalist ver-
sion of free trade - the nationalists gradually conquered the Liberal
Party and ultimately captured it for their cause. One analyst thus
writes that during the early 1970s, the Liberal Party "was being led
into the unfamiliar territory of economic nationalism." 16 Furthermore,
economic xenophobia had not only conquered the hearts of the Liberals
(or at least of increasing numbers of them), it was even more firmly
entrenched in the New Democratic Party, where the "Waffle Group"
functioned as the left wing shocktroop of nationalism."' Lastly, within
the framework of Confederation (as compared to that of party politics),
economic nationalism appealed particularly to Ontario politicians. That
province had long been saturated with foreign capital and was in eco-
nomically buoyant times, so many of its politicians believed that it
could afford the luxury of "Canadianization". 1 7
Second, the media and especially magazines like MacLean's which
suffered from the competition of Time and other American publica-
tions, likewise embraced the cause of economic nationalism."' Since the
media reflect and shape public opinion and are in a position to make or
break a politician's career,1 9 it is clear that the Trudeau Cabinet must
have realized that it could not ignore their nationalist message with
political impunity.
Last, a number of private interest groups added their voices to the
chorus of economic nationalism. Among these "vested self-interests",
which found it opportune to "cloak [themselves] in articulate national-
15 Laxer, supra note 5 at 12; Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, The Cabinet as a Regulatory
Body: The Case of the Foreign Investment Review Act (1980) at 12.
Is Surich, "Purists and Pragmatists: Canadian Democratic Socialism at the Crossroads" in
Penniman, Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974 (1975) at 125-31. The "Waffle
Manifesto" of October 1969 is reprinted in Fox, ed., Politics Canada; Culture and Progress, 3rd.
ed. (1970) at 242-45.
17 See e.g., Calvet & Crener, "Foreign Busines Control: the Canadian Experience 1973-
1977" (1979) 22 C.P.P. 3 at 435; also Butler & Carrier, eds., The Trudeau Decade (1979) at
204-205.
Is Audley, Canada's Cultural Industries: Broadcasting, Publishing, Records and Film
(1983) at 60.
29 Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 15.
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ism,''2 were "indigenous Canadian capitalists [who] . ..serve a mar-
ket in competition with American [or other foreign] branch plants or
imports."' 2' This especially included Canadian publishers, who did not
benefit from the lower "unit costs for publication" enjoyed by their
U.S. counterparts due to access to a gigantic domestic market.22 More-
over, the politicians could hardly afford to disregard the interests of the
perhaps not very numerous but certainly very influential nationalist
publishers and of the many authors who tended to share the publishers'
views. Nationalist agitation on the part of politicians, media personali-
ties and publishers eventually spawned a formal lobby with the founda-
tion in 1970 of the "Committee for an Independent Canada"(CIC),
which attracted such nationalist luminaries as Walter Gordon and Pe-
ter Newman.23
With economic nationalism sweeping the land, the Trudeau Cabi-
net must have wondered whether it could afford the political costs of its
favourite policy option with regard to FDI, namely inertia. For the
leaders of the nation to be perceived as unconcerned about foreign own-
ership obviously became more and more risky as an increasingly large
proportion of the Canadian electorate became sensitive to this issue and
demanded controls on FDI. Political considerations in general, and
electoral calculations in particular, thus made it progressively more dif-
ficult, and eventually virtually impossible, for Trudeau to ignore this
demand.
B. The Decision to Regulate Foreign Direct Investment
To avoid being politically obliterated by the explosion of national-
ism, Trudeau had to do something. However, he had no desire to capit-
ulate unconditionally to nationalist demands. Unconvinced, as he had
always been, of the economic wisdom of nationalist policies, but finally
awakened to their political indispensability, Trudeau merely sought to
pacify the nationalists with what the American political scientist Mur-
ray Edelman has called "forms of symbolic reassurance".4
In The Choice of Governing Instrument, Trebilcock, Hartle,
Prichard and Dewees point out that politicians often try to satisfy cer-
tain public demands symbolically by ordering an inquiry into the issues
20 Reuber, Canada's Political Economy: Current Issues (1980) at 221.
21 Layton, supra note 8 at 223, 227. See Martin, "An Act of Lunacy: Book Publishing in
Canada" in Innis, ed., Issues for the Seventies: Americanization (1972) at 55ff.
22 Migu6, Nationalistic Policies in Canada: An Economic Approach (1979) at 10-11.
23 Layton, supra note 8 at 229.
24 Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964) at 153.
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which inspired these demands, and they suggest that the efficiency of
this course of action may be enhanced by "the appointment of high-
profile individuals to head [such an] inquiry."2 Thus, faced with the
increasing concern of the Canadian public with regard to the problem
of foreign ownership, the Trudeau Cabinet in 1969 ordered a study of
that problem and appointed a "high-profile" nationalist, Herb Gray, to
head the inquiry.26
The problem of foreign ownership had been studied before and
studied rather thoroughly.2 7 The inquiry which was to produce the
Gray Report, however, may be said to have served a different purpose,
namely to placate a Canadian public in a nationalist mood. Conse-
quently, and not without some reason, it has been described as a
"smokescreen" and a "diversion". 28 To use sociological language, stud-
ying the effects of FDI may have been the "manifest" function of the
Gray inquiry, but pacifying a Canadian public in a nationalist mood
was its "latent" or real function. However, from this viewpoint the
Gray Report was hardly a success. The report was leaked to the nation-
alist press in December 1971 with the consequence that it had to be
published shortly thereafter, much too early for the taste of the Cabi-
net. In political life, "the actual conclusion of an inquiry increases the
pressures on politicians to implement the policy advocated by the in-
quiry. '29 The premature publication of the Gray Report, thus, defeated
the Cabinet's real purpose in ordering the inquiry, namely to rid itself
of the pressure to do anything at all for as long as possible (and hope-
fully until the day nationalism would cease to appeal to so many
Canadians). Instead, publication increased the country's nationalist fe-
ver and emboldened those who demanded firm government action in
place of the traditional Liberal "policies of hopeful sleep-walking." 30
The press, in particular, whipped up nationalist sentiment in the wake
of the publication of the Gray Report and mercilessly castigated the
Trudeau Cabinet's stand on foreign ownership as "feeble and half-
baked", as a "timid effort", and so forth.3'
22 Trebilcock et a., supra note 2 at 47-49.
26 A Citizen's Guide to the Gray Report (1971) at 6. The Gray Inquiry produced a report
entitled Foreign Direct Investment in Canada (1972), commonly known as the "Gray Report".
27 E.g., in Can., Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry (the Watkins
Report) (1968).
28 Layton, supra note 8 at 228.
29 Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 48.
20 McMillan, supra note 9 at 216; Layton, supra note 8 at 229; Munton & Poel, supra note
I 1 at 230; "sleepwalking" quote from The Canadian Forum (Dec. 1971) as reprinted in A Citi-
zen's Guide, supra note 26 at 9.
31 Quotes from The Ottawa Citizen (19 Oct. 1972) and La Presse (27 Oct. 1972), resped-
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The event which finally forced Trudeau's hand was the election of
October 30, 1972, which resulted in a Liberal minority government
whose survival depended on the goodwill of the NDP, a bastion of eco-
nomic nationalism. Shortly thereafter, Trudeau announced that he in-
tended to present "foreign takeover legislation" formulated in such a
way as to "gain majority [that is, NDP as well as Liberal] support in
the House. ' ' 32 Consequently, the "Foreign Investment Review Bill," 3
has been described as a "commitment" made by Trudeau to the NDP
"in return for the latter's necessary support in a minority Parliament"3 4
and as "a compromise measure forced upon the minority Liberal gov-
ernment of 1972-74 by its temporary Socialist partner. '35
However, the desire for NDP support cannot fully explain FIRA.
A shrewd politician like Trudeau would not have made the fateful (and
not easily reversible) move of changing the course of his Liberal gov-
ernment's and Party's ship into the unfamiliar direction of economic
nationalism for the sake of a temporary partnership alone. Moreover,
he could not possibly have expected or wished to prolong the life of his
minority government indefinitely. Rather, the election results most
likely convinced him that nationalism was here to stay and that it was
politically safe, if not imperative, for the Liberal leadership to embrace
it.38 Trudeau was probably already planning the next election and cal-
culating that a commitment to economic nationalism would facilitate
future electoral success.
A crucial factor in this "vote-maximizing calculus" was the Liber-
als' crushing defeat in Ontario, the heartland of economic national-
ism, 37 which would have to be reconquered by the Liberals if they were
again to form a majority government.3 8 Ontarians were clearly the all-
important marginal voters of whom Public Choice theory holds that
their electoral favours may be harvested by those politicians who are
able, first of all, to identify the "policy issues to which they attach the
tively, cited in Butler & Carrier, supra note 18 at 236, 239. See also articles from The Toronto
Star, The Edmonton Journal, etc., quoted in House of Commons debate (29 May 1972).
32 "Trudeau announces he will stay on as PM", The Globe & Mail (3 Nov. 1972); also
Munton & Poel, supra note 11 at 231.
31 The Bill was introduced in the House of Commons a few months later (24 Jan. 1973) and
enacted on 12 Dec. 1973.
34 Cody, "Canada in 1990: What Kind of Federation?" in Armstrong, Armstrong & Wilcox,
eds., Canada and the United States: Dependence and Divergence (1982) at 38.
88 Rugman, supra note 11 at 129.
8 It is probably no coincidence that it was shortly after the 1972 election that the Liberal
Party adopted a red maple leaf (encased in a large "L") as its official emblem.
87 See, e.g., the election results for that province in The Globe & Mail (31 Oct. 1972).
8 Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 at 28.
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most importance" and, secondly, to produce "an election platform that
is most likely to attract their support." With economic nationalism in
general and FDI regulation in particular, then, Trudeau believed he
could win the favours of the marginal voters of Ontario.
III. WHY FIRA?
A. Why a "Screening Mechanism"?
Many policy instruments are available to regulate foreign direct
investment. First, tax policy, and more specifically the introduction of a
"foreign takeover tax", is regarded by many economists as the most
efficient method to restrict the flow of international capital across its
borders. 39 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, taxation was the instru-
ment for the regulation of FDI which was most feared by free traders
and most enthusiastically endorsed by economic nationalists.40 Second,
the "key sector" approach is similarly highly touted by experts. It had
been used successfully by previous Canadian governments to prevent
foreign control in such fields as banking, utilities, transportation and
communications (the "commanding heights" of our economy). 41 Third,
a "fixed rules" concept is allegedly also a potent regulatory response to
the challenge of foreign control. A version promoted by Walter Gordon
in the early 1970s called on the government to "announce clearly...
that within a stated period of years . . . all large Canadian companies
must become 51 percent owned by Canadians. '42 An even more drastic
solution to the problem of foreign control is nationalization as effected
by the governments of Qu6bec and Saskatchewan in the asbestos and
potash industries. 3
Yet, despite the availability of these efficient policy options for
dealing with FDI, the Trudeau Cabinet managed not to select any of
them. Instead, a "screening mechanism" was adopted, a policy instru-
11 Rugman, supra note 11 at 3.
41 Hufbauer & Samet, "Investment Relations between Canada and the United States" in
Armstrong, Armstrong & Wilcox, supra note 34 at 117; Layton, supra note 8 at 225-27.
41 Rugman, supra note 11 at 124-25; Reuber, supra note 20 at 225.
42 Hayden & Burns, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Canada (1976) at 6-9;
Gordon, "A Choice for Canada" in Rotstein & Lax, eds., Independence: The Canadian Challenge
(1972) at 74.
The Wahn Report of 1970 had even gone further by recommending the same "fixed rule"
concept for all companies operating in Canada. See Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge:
Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship (1982) at 85; and Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton,
supra note 15 at 11-12.
'3 Hufbauer & Samet, supra note 40 at 115. Reference is made to the essays on the nation-
alization of the Saskatchewan potash and Quebec asbestos industries, in Tupper & Doern, eds.,
Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada (1981).
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ment which ranks low on the experts' scale of regulatory potency.44
Although the efficiency of such a mechanism will depend on how
"screening" is interpreted and implemented by those who run (or con-
trol) it, "screening" as performed by FIRA was to be tantamount to
rubber stamping, as a quick glance at its record of approvals indi-
cates.45 Moreover, unlike the policy instruments cited earlier (which
can deal with both new and existing FDI), "screening" affects only new
FDI. Therefore, even under the best of circumstances, Trudeau's
"screening mechanism" could not have been expected to perform great
regulatory deeds in the service of the "Canadianization" of the
economy.46
The reason an efficient instrument for the regulation of FDI was
not chosen is quite simply that efficient regulation - the kind of regu-
lation which could be expected to reduce foreign investment levels -
was unwanted. Revealing in this respect was Minister of Industry,
Trade and Commerce, Alastair Gillespie's slip of the tongue during a
parliamentary debate on March 30, 1973. The disadvantage of efficient
instruments such as "mandatory Canadian ownership . ..across the
board", he declared in a moment of disarming (but undoubtedly unin-
tentional) frankness, was that "it could discourage needed foreign in-
vestment, 4, 7 or, in other words, that it might actually work! The Cabi-
net clearly continued to believe in the economic indispensability of
FDI. Even as it was formulating policies which it wanted the national-
ist public to support, it was determined to allow international invest-
ment capital to remain in and continue to enter the country. Paradoxi-
cally, a complex regulatory scheme thus served to prevent genuine,
effective regulation because the government did not believe in the eco-
nomic but only in the political need for FDI regulation (that is, in its
usefulness for electoral purposes).
In the case of FIRA, regulatory efficiency was unwanted for many
44 See, e.g., Rugman, supra note 11 at 3.
45 See infra, Appendix, "Proposals allowed by FIRA". FIRA itself made no secret of the fact
that approximately 90% of all proposals received approval: "By March 31, 1982, the Government
of Canada had rendered a decision on 4,013 investment proposals of which approximately 90%
were judged to be of significant benefit to Canada and were, therefore, allowed" ("How FIRA
Works" (1982) 6 For. Inv. Rev. 1).
In the case of new business ventures, for example, the percentage of approved cases was
consistently in the high eighties; these (and other) statistics are given in Foreign Investment
Review.
46 As Mel Watkins cynically observed, FIRA "leaves untouched the existing activities of
[foreign-owned] corporations when most of our industry just happens to be foreign owned." Wat-
kins, "Contradictions and Alternatives in Canada's Future" in Laxer, ed., (Canada) Ltd. The
Political Economy of Dependency (1973) at 261.
47 House of Commons Debates (30 March 1973).
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reasons: Trudeau's personal conviction; Liberal Party traditions and
laissez-faire ideology; and the advice of authoritative economists. As
well, it was certain to provoke the wrath of American and other foreign
investors. Since the majority of existing as well as new foreign capital
in our country was (and is) of America origin, any real restriction of
FDI in Canada was likely to antagonize the United States. The spectre
of American economic reprisals thus reinforced what was already an
instinctive determination on the part of the Trudeau Cabinet not to
regulate FDI efficiently."'
Lastly, the threat of retaliation from Canada's own continentalist
business and finance elite loomed just as formidably. Approximately
ten years before FIRA was established, this powerful interest group
had reacted in a most uncharitable manner when former Finance Min-
ister Walter Gordon had called for the introduction of a thirty percent
foreign takeover tax, which would have been a genuinely efficient re-
striction on FDI.
The reaction of the financial elite of the country was immediate and hard-hit-
ting .... The coercive power of threats by leaders of the financial community
.... when brought to bear on those politicians ... was sufficient to produce a
rapid retreat by the cabinet, and the offensive measures were withdrawn. .... 4.
The lessons of this showdown (and of the subsequent forced resignation
of Gordon) were unlikely to have been lost on Trudeau, who must have
been determined not to suffer a similar humiliating setback for the sake
of a regulatory measure in which he personally (in contrast to the na-
tionalist Gordon) did not even believe.
Thus, because regulatory efficiency was unwanted for many com-
pelling reasons, an efficient instrument was not chosen. Instead, the
Trudeau Cabinet created FIRA, a move which has been condemned as
"ineffective and misconceived" 50 and which has correctly been judged
to be "unlikely to rouse the [American] eagle from its [Canadian in-
vestment] roost."'5 1 Since these commentators wrongly assumed that
the decision to regulate FDI meant that the government intended to
pursue regulatory efficiency, they were exasperated and bewildered by
what they perceived to be the illogical choice of an inefficient instru-
ment.52 However, the choice is perfectly logical from the standpoint of
4" See, e.g., Globerman, U.S. Ownership of Firms in Canada: Issues and Policy Approaches
(1979) at 89.
49 Layton, supra note 8 at 225; also McMillan, supra note 9 at 237.
1* Rugman, supra note 11 at 3.
51 Clarkson, supra note 42 at 85.
"I In all fairness, however, it must be said that later on in his book Rugman does come to the
conclusion that the choice of regulatory instrument reflected a political decision. See supra note
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governing politicians, who are motivated first and foremost by calcula-
tions of a political nature. In this respect, and only in this respect, was
the choice of a "screening mechanism" not only perfectly logical but
also very effective. In other words, the selection of a regulatory instru-
ment, which as its critics claimed and its performance was to demon-
strate, was intrinsically inefficient, was politically rational.
B. Symbolic Satisfaction for the Nationalist Public
The decision to regulate FDI did not reflect a desire on the part of
the Trudeau Cabinet to promote the "Canadianization" of our econ-
omy, but was dictated by the political need to placate a Canadian elec-
torate in a nationalist mood. To impress what appeared to be the na-
tionalist majority, and thus to regain their electoral favour, was the
rationale behind the creation of FIRA. The true raison d'etre of the
screening Agency was to permit politicians, who had hitherto been per-
ceived as hostile or at best indifferent to the cause of economic nation-
alism, to pose as champions of the ideal of Canadian economic inde-
pendence. Thus, FIRA's establishment was merely "an exercise in
symbolic politics." 53
However, in contrast to the Gray inquiry, which had been
launched by the Trudeau Cabinet for a similar purpose, FIRA was
predestined to be a successful exercise in symbolic politics. This was
because of a number of design features which might have been consid-
ered coincidental had they not proved so eminently functional for the
purpose of what the French call "'pater les bourgeois".54 For one
thing, the government probably did not mind if the nationalist burghers
of Canada expected (or at least hoped) that the Agency's name alone
would strike fear into the hearts of foreign investors. FIRA, moreover,
stands for "Foreign Investment Review Agency", a fine title which,
purposely or not, created the impression that the Agency enjoyed
sweeping jurisdiction over all foreign investment. Yet, in reality, FIRA
dealt only with FDI and not with so-called portfolio investment from
abroad. Furthermore, much FDI was likewise outside FIRA's mandate,
for example existing FDI and new FDI that could be shown to be re-
lated in some way to existing FDI (even though it was precisely this
II at 140-41.
53 Schultz, Canadian Regulation of Foreign Investment (preliminary seminar notes, 17 Nov.
1981) at 3; also Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 21; Molot & Williams, "A
Political Economy of Continentaligm" in Whittington & Williams, eds., Canadian Politics into
the 1980s (1981) at 74.
54 "Mesmerize the burghers" [author's trans.]
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type which accounted for "a majority of the new direct investment re-
corded in official statistics of foreign control").5 5 Clearly, FIRA's pow-
ers were never anywhere as great as its name may have led the public
to believe.
FIRA's mandate, furthermore, was formulated in an extremely
ambiguous manner. The Agency was created to "screen" new FDI pro-
posals, whatever that may mean. This ambiguity clearly worked in
Trudeau's favour since, as Edelman points out, wishful thinking tends
to characterize the public's interpretation of the frequently equivocal
language of politicians. Nationalists were thus encouraged to believe
that "screening" FDI proposals meant what they wanted it to mean,
namely obstructing such proposals. (To interpret "screening" in this
manner is not entirely unrealistic: the Merriam-Webster Thesaurus
lists "block out, obstruct, shut out" and similar terms as synonymous
for "to screen".) In any event, the ambiguous language of the Foreign
Investment Review Act undoubtedly led many nationalists to think that
FIRA did have at least the potential to inhibit FDI,56 particularly since
the criterion which would legally guide those who would be doing the
"screening" was proclaimed to be nothing less than "significant benefit
to Canada". 57
The nationalist public was in all likelihood also very impressed
that a "screening mechanism" had been warmly recommended in the
Gray Report as the most appropriate means for dealing with FDI. This
further reinforced the general impression that the Trudeau Cabinet
had the best nationalist interests at heart when it set up FIRA. Public
attention was thus conveniently diverted from the fact that much more
efficient policy instruments could have been chosen, for example the 51
percent "fixed rule" concept recommended in the 1970 Wahn Report.
It is possible that the Gray inquiry had been commissioned, at least in
part, for the purpose of recommending less efficient FDI remedies than
those advocated in the Wahn Report, a report which was admittedly
"by far the most radical of the studies [of FDI] in its
recommendations".5 8
Lastly, the independence of regulatory agencies is often thought to
increase the likelihood of effective regulatory action.59 However, con-
5 Rugman, supra note 11 at 129-30; Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 437.
56 Edelman, supra note 24 at 81.
11 [Emphasis added.] See, e.g., Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 421-23.
88 Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 11.
89 Sabatier, "Regulatory Policy-Making: Toward a Framework of Analysis" (1977) 17 Nat.
Res. J. 429.
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trary to what FIRA's name implied and what the public was en-
couraged (or at least permitted) to believe, the Foreign Investment Re-
view Agency was never an independent regulatory body but served
merely to "advise and assist" the Cabinet.60 Experts are at a loss to
explain FIRA's peculiar institutional arrangement in which impressive
formal attributes of independent decision-making were combined with
the status of mere "regulatory slave" of the Cabinet. In spite of
FIRA's lack of independence, the Cabinet nevertheless invested the
Agency with spurious attributes of regulatory independence because
the appearance of regulatory independence was undoubtedly functional
for FIRA's purpose of impressing the nationalist public.
The establishment of FIRA, then, was a dramatic, highly visible
gesture, which served admirably to symbolize the government's com-
mitment to economic nationalism, to steal the thunder even of those
perspicacious nationalist critics (like Mel Watkins) who realized that
the new Agency was merely a facade, and thus to achieve what
Edelman calls the "symbolic satisfaction" of the restless nationalistic
public. That Canada's nationalists were greatly impressed with Tru-
deau's apparent conversion to the popular cause of economic national-
ism was evidenced by the results of the general election of July 8, 1974.
Whereas Trudeau's inertia with regard to foreign ownership had cost
him votes - particularly in nationalist Ontario - in 1972 when for-
eign ownership had been a crucial electoral theme, symbolic nationalist
gestures (such as the establishment of FIRA) enabled him to defuse
that issue so that, at the very least, votes were not lost on that account
in 1974. Perhaps most importantly, the "marginal voters" of nationalist
Ontario returned en masse to the Liberal fold.61 An important ingredi-
ent in this success was the creation of FIRA, a gesture which had in-
duced the hitherto antagonistic media to portray Trudeau as the proud
standard-bearer of economic nationalism. 2
FIRA was destined for a long career as a vote-maximizing tool. It
was successfully manipulated again by Trudeau in order to mesmerize
the nationalist general public, media and interest groups during the
1980 general election campaign. The Liberal leader expected - and
apparently achieved - electoral gain from a promise to strengthen the
Agency, inter alia, by giving FIRA control over established foreign
60 See, e.g., Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 18ff.
' See, e.g., "Liberals Recover from 1972 Collapse, Add 19 Seats to Sweep Ontario Rid-
ings", The Globe & Mail (9 July 1974).
e2 Fletcher, "The Mass Media and the 1974 Canadian Election" in Penniman, Canada at the
Polls: The General Election of 1974 (1975) at 252ff: Munton & Poel, supra note 11 at 242.
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owned firms (in other words, over existing FDI).63 However, in view of
what was said earlier about the reason for excluding existing FDI in
FIRA's original jurisdiction, it is not surprising that this particular
campaign promise was later unceremoniously repudiated by Trudeau. 4
Not all nationalists were as impressed with FIRA as the general
public who could not be expected to investigate whether the Agency
was indeed efficient for "Canadianization" purposes."' FIRA was sub-
jected to merciless criticism by numerous nationalist politicians, aca-
demics and journalists and was ridiculed in nationalist quarters as a
totally inadequate instrument for controlling FDI.6 6 Such objections,
however, do not invalidate the claim that the Agency was a highly effi-
cient political symbol and a formidable vote-maximizing tool. The na-
tionalist critics of FIRA were few in number in comparison to the
many nationalists who took a more favourable view of the Agency, and
it is the majority sentiment that matters to "vote-maximizers". Thus,
although perspicacious nationalists continued to criticize the govern-
ment's stand on FDI even after the creation of FIRA, they could not
prevent Trudeau from reaping the electoral rewards of his ostensibly
nationalist policy decision. Moreover, even those nationalists who were
critical of FIRA could not help being mesmerized to some extent by
the Agency. They may not have been impressed by either its establish-
ment or its performance, but they liked its potential. In other words,
they appeared to believe that, with the necessary changes, FIRA could
yet become an efficient instrument for "Canadianization" objectives.
Lastly, few, if any, nationalists - even among those who were highly
critical of FIRA - would have liked to see the Agency dissolved, '7
which indicated that they, too, were to a certain degree seduced by the
charm of that political symbol.
Finally, it can be argued that the fact that some nationalists con-
sistently criticized FIRA actually corroborates the claim that the
Agency served as a potent political symbol. Edelman, the theoretician
of "symbolic politics", suggests that "political discontent" cannot be
effectively silenced by "fulfilling its claims". "Achievement of an aspi-
"3 "We Broke Election Vow: PM", The Toronto Star (9 Dec. 1982); Clarkson, supra note 42
at 20, 83, 87-88.
64 Ibid.; "PM Links FIRA Stand to Slump", The Globe & Mail (9 Dec. 1982).
65 On the theme of "rational ignorance", which postulates that most voters do not find it
worthwhile to check the efficiency of specific policy programmes, see, e.g., Trebilcock et al., supra
note 2 at 30-31.
" See, e.g., Desbarats, Canada Lost - Canada Found: The Search for a New Nation
(1981) at 53-54.
67 See, e.g., "FIRA's Work is Vital", The Sunday Star (27 Feb. 1983).
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ration level", he says, "leads to a higher aspiration level." The use of
"forms of symbolic reassurance", on the other hand, effectively pre-
vents escalation to "higher aspiration levels", according to Edelman.68
Thus, it can be argued that had real FDI restrictions been introduced,
it would have generated new and more ambitious nationalist demands
and, conversely, that creating inefficient (that is, merely symbolic) bar-
riers against FDI prevented such an escalation. The establishment of
FIRA achieved the latter result, since criticism of the Agency tended
to take up the time and energies of precisely those pugnacious national-
ists who would have been most likely to formulate new demands had
their original objectives in the field of FDI controls been achieved.
Viewed in this light, FIRA appears to have performed remarkably well
in the fulfillment of its role as a political symbol created for the pur-
pose of appeasing the nationalist public.
IV. FIRA, "SCREEN" OR "FUNNEL" FOR FDI?
A. FIRA: Designed for Regulatory Inefficiency
The establishment of FIRA was a dramatic, highly visible gesture
which served primarily to satisfy the nationalist public in a symbolic
way. Moreover, the choice of a "screening mechanism" as instrument
for the regulation of FDI also enabled the Trudeau Cabinet to avoid
losing the favour of Canada's continentalist interest groups because it
was merely a symbolic gesture, a stratagem enabling the Agency's po-
litical sponsors to harvest the nationalist vote without really hurting the
interests of the powerful continentalists6 9 By means of FIRA, the Tru-
deau Cabinet managed not only to impress those who favoured foreign
investment regulation but also to remain in the good graces of those
who opposed such regulation.
Foreign investors, the American government, Canadian con-
tinentalist interest groups and other proponents of the free flow of in-
ternational investment capital across Canada's borders probably re-
sponded to the establishment of FIRA with a collective sigh of relief; if
they did not, they certainly should have, for they knew that, in view of
so much nationalist pressure Ottawa was forced to do something about
foreign ownership. Many of them had feared much worse than the
screening agency which confronted them"0 and were undoubtedly
08 Edelman, supra note 24 at 153-55.
'o Resnick, supra note 4 at 152.
70 See, e.g., Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Submission on Foreign Investment in the
Context of a Canadian Industrial Strategy (to Minister of Industry, Trade & Commerce) (1973)
at 17.
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pleased that the establishment of FIRA neatly eliminated taxation
schemes, the "key sector" approach, the "fixed rules" concept, nation-
alization and other efficient instruments of FDI regulation. In contrast
to those schemes, which could have been expected drastically to affect
all (or most) foreign ownership in Canada, FIRA was given authority
to deal only with certain types of new FDI. The Agency's jurisdiction
or "substantive rule-making authority" was thus extremely restricted
from the start. Since "limitations on an agency's authority render ag-
gressive regulation more difficult if not impossible", 1 it is clear that
foreign investors and continentalist Canadians must have been greatly
relieved when it was decided that FDI would be regulated by a screen-
ing agency instead of another instrument. Many foreign investments
were safely out of FIRA's reach, and those which were not faced
"unaggressive regulation" instead of the regulatory rigours of, say, a
"fixed rules" concept. Finally, there is reason to believe that some for-
eign investors may actually have been delighted when FIRA was cre-
ated - owners (and managers) of existing foreign-owned enterprises
presumably expected to benefit from the restrictions FIRA was to im-
pose on new FDI.
Existing [foreign direct] investments would be perpetuated in certain areas for
lack of new firms entering. The tariff shelter would compound the protection
from competition and tend to increase the oligopolistic structure of Canadian
industry.7 12
Although the restrictions FIRA was destined to impose on new FDI
were never serious enough to fulfill this optimistic expectation, a deep
sense of relief, at the very least, characterized the initial reaction of
foreign investors and of Canadian continentalists to the creation of
FIRA, even though they were sufficiently astute not to express this re-
lief in public.
Yet, the "vote-maximizing calculus" of the politicians who had
created FIRA demanded that the beneficiaries of the political scheme
- in this case the powerful continentalist business interest - be aware
of the favour they received for "from a politician's perspective a benefit
unperceived . .. is no benefit at all."'7 3 This consideration called for
the careful management (or manipulation) of information, which had
to be dispensed selectively so that the "right" kind of information
reached the "right" party. While the Canadian mass media were rhap-
sodizing about the nationalist merit of the government's regulatory pol-
71 Sabatier, supra note 59 at 426-27.
7- Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 430; similar views in Migu6, supra note 22 at 48.
73 Trebilcock et aL, supra note 2 at 34.
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icy, that same government discreetly commissioned or inspired articles
to be written for certain professional publications and speeches to be
made to selected gatherings. These articles and speeches were aimed at
convincing free traders and continentalists, both in Canada and abroad,
that FIRA procedures constituted a harmless regulatory formality. For
example, in a 1975 article in The Canadian Banker, a FIRA official
eulogized the "gradualism and pragmatism" cultivated by his Agency,
the "flexibility" of its criteria and its "mostly permissive" application
of the relevant legislation. Last, but not least, the same official proudly
emphasized FIRA's limited jurisdiction, stating that "many kinds of
expansion and diversification remain open to established foreign-con-
trolled firms without passing through the Agency at all."' 74 Moreover,
in a pamphlet expressly commissioned by the Canadian government for
the purpose of enlightening and reasssuring foreign investors, it was
stressed
...that Canadians are not banana republic revolutionaries and will, therefore,
probably apply this new law in a manner far less destructive to reasonable com-
mercial purposes than would be possible under the wide powers given. 75
To the uninitiated, this euphemistic code language may have sounded
cryptic or strangely irrelevant; but insiders, keenly attuned to this sort
of communication, received the government's signal perfectly clearly
and brought it to the attention of their peers in similarly veiled profes-
sional jargon. For example, the message that "significant benefit to
Canada" - FIRA's ostensibly tough condition for the acceptance of a
proposal - was in reality not a formidable hurdle at all was advertised
in The Canadian Bar Review of May 1975 by two legal commentators
who by means of a subtle hint drew the attention of their fellow law-
yers to the government's remarkably flexible guidelines defining "sig-
nificant benefit". "The[se] guidelines", they wrote, "may in certain cir-
cumstances be of assistance to non-eligible persons required to consider
them."7 8
In addition, even the pattern of reporting on FIRA seemed to re-
flect the government's efforts to dispense information selectively. For
example, from a quick perusal of the headlines of The Globe and Mail,
the nationalist public may well have concluded that FIRA performed
like a merciless regulatory guillotine. Yet, small articles in the Globe's
business section, which targets the predominantly continentalist Cana-
74 Byleveld, "Foreign Investment Review Act: Now Fully Hatched" (1975) 82 Can. Banker
6; see also Rugman, supra note 11 at 140.
7 Langford, Canadian Foreign Investment Controls (1974), at 29.
71 Donaldson & Jackson, infra note 91 at 234.
FIRA
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
dian business community, clearly tended to report FIRA approvals and
consistently emphasized the goodwill of the Agency's officials, the flexi-
bility of its rules and so on."' To avoid attracting the attention of out-
siders, who may not have valued these success stories, FIRA was some-
times not even mentioned in the titles of these articles.7 8
This strange pattern of reporting - of which the Globe's editors
were probably not even aware - may not have made much sense jour-
nalistically, but it did serve the government's purpose of channeling
certain types of information to certain types of people. It is not unrea-
sonable to speculate, therefore, that this kind of reporting was the re-
sult of deliberate but subtle efforts of government politicians or FIRA
officials (or both) to "feed" certain stories to certain reporters. Al-
though it cannot be known with certainty if this was really the case, it
would come as no surprise to Public Choice theorists who believe that,
even here in Canada, such practices are very much part and parcel of
what they view as the "real world" of politics.79
B. More Safeguards for the Continentalist Interests
Via such channels, then, foreign investors and Canadian con-
tinentalists were discreetly informed and effectively convinced that,
under the circumstances, FIRA was not a bad deal and that, in spite of
all the nationalist fanfare which accompanied its appearance on the
Canadian regulatory scene (and which was intended for the public gal-
lery), the Agency was definitely not destined to achieve great regula-
tory deeds. Canada's continentalist elite of finance and business was
duly impressed by the benevolence and shrewdness displayed by the
Trudeau Cabinet; some of its more prominent representatives, such as
77 A good example of a "FIRA is tough" article is Godfrey.'s feature, "FIRA Closes Door to
US Managers", The Globe & Mail (24 Sept. 1983); for a typical "FIRA is easy" article, see
"Only 8% of Proposals Turned Down by FIRA", Globe's "Report on Business" section (14 Apr.
1983).
78 A striking example is an article which was published on May 26, 1983, under the incon-
spicuous title, "Campbell [Soup Co. Ltd.] pays parent $232 million dividend". It actually de-
scribed how a foreign-owned company had dodged FIRA rules and flagrantly violated perhaps not
the letter but certainly the spirit of FDI legislation. The heartwarming message conveyed to the
readers of the Globe's "Report on Business" was that with a modicum of imagination managers
could devise all sorts of stratagems to circumvent FIRA. It is fascinating to contrast the discreet
format of this article, buried deep in The Globe and Mail's business section, with the illustrated
full-page feature which had appeared in the regular section of the same paper six months earlier
in order to trumpet FIRA's regulatory achievements in the feild of book publishing. Johnson, "A
Big Break for Bookmen?", The Globe & Mail (27 Nov. 1982).
'0 Reference is to the treatment of the "media game" in Trebilcock et al., supra note 2 esp.
at 15: "On occasion . . . senior bureaucrats do provide inside information on a 'not for attribu-
tion' basis to 'reliable' journalists", and at 17: "... the mass media can be exploited at times by
politicians".
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David Kinnear of the T. Eaton Company, expressed their satisfaction,
stating that they were gratified that FIRA incorporated the "reasona-
ble guidelines on foreign ownership" and the "constructive national-
ism" which they themselves claimed to favour.80
Nevertheless, some continentalists were less confident. They ac-
cepted the government's unspoken assurance that it did not intend
FIRA to be an efficient regulatory instrument, but wondered if the gov-
ernment could also guarantee that its regulatory show would never de-
generate into real regulation. What they feared above all was that, like
a regulatory Frankenstein, FIRA might some day escape the control of
its creator and commit real regulatory massacres instead of the simu-
lated ones for which it had been brought to life.81 In this respect, too,
the Trudeau Cabinet proved to be extremely understanding and co-op-
erative. As a safeguard against the fearsome possibility that FIRA
might ever be "captured" by the nationalist interest and thus be used
for truly xenophobic regulatory purposes, it was decided not to make
FIRA an independent regulatory agency.8 This eliminated any chance
of regulatory efficiency (or, as Sabatier puts it, "aggressiveness"), and
kept FIRA closely under the wings of the Cabinet itself. Consequently,
FIRA was never a real regulatory agency - as one commentator has
it, "to describe the Agency's work as regulatory may be to overstate its
role."8' 3 In reality, FIRA performed the rather modest function of "ad-
vising and assisting" the Cabinet, which reserved the final decisions
and thus the actual regulating for itself.8 4 The possibility that fanatical
nationalists or other overly eager regulators might "capture" the
Agency was thus neatly eliminated. 5 The decision to have FIRA's
commissioners serve "at pleasure" rather than to grant the customary
security of tenures8 must be viewed in the same light.
An expert on regulation in Canada points out that the desire forimpartiality in regulation is the rationale behind independent regula-
o Cited in Resnick, supra note 4 at 156.
" See, e.g., "Submission", supra note 70 at 26; also Clement, "The Corporate Elite, the
Capitalist Class, and the Canadian State" in Panitch, ed., The Canadian State: Political Econ-
omy and Political Power (1977) at 238: "[Canadian capitalists] were concerned how the [FDI]
controls would be used and by whom."
12 As had been advised by those who believed that regulatory efficiency was wanted, see, e.g.,
McMillan, supra note 9 at 255 ff., who cited the successful example of Japan's independent "for-
eign investment council" but admitted that the latter was actually "too successful in the eyes of
some critics"; that, of course, is precisely why Trudeau was not interested in such a scheme.
83 Trebilcock et.al, supra note 2 at 37.
14 Schultz, Federalism and the Regulatory Process (1979) at 44-45; Hayden & Burns, supra
note 42 at 31; see also Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 3-4.
'0 Rugman, supra note 11 at 130.
6 Schultz, supra note 84 at 44.
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tory agencies. 87 Thus, it is likely that FIRA's lack of independence was
inspired by the government's desire not to have the Agency regulate
impartially. The general public with its nationalist proclivities, how-
ever, had to be kept in the dark about the real reasons for turning
FIRA into a mere regulatory maid-servant of the Cabinet. This was
not an easy task. In the early stages of the Agency's career, in particu-
lar, government officials experienced great difficulty in justifying the
decision to the inquisitive media. Minister of Industry, Trade and Com-
merce Jean-Luc P~pin, for instance, described it awkwardly as "a com-
promise" - without specifying, of course, why a compromise was
needed - and offered the lame excuse that the government had
wanted to avoid "creating another centre of competence, bringing
about costly and unnecessary duplication." 88 Fortunately for the gov-
ernment, however, inspired students of regulation soon invented fine hy-
pothetical rationales for FIRA's lack of autonomy. One observer was to
eulogize this "dynamic monitoring" of the Agency by the Cabinet and
to lionize it as the hallmark of "a new [and supposedly superior]
breed" of regulation.89 Such statements served admirably to obfuscate
the real reasons for the Cabinet's control over FIRA and to keep the
nationalist public happy.90
Similarly, the lack of openness of FIRA procedures contributed to
regulatory inefficiency. Critics in general and lawyers in particular re-
sented the notorious inscrutability of the Agency's modus operandi.
They castigated the lack of "due process" and the confusion and uncer-
tainty which stemmed, in their opinion, from an overdose of ministerial
discretion and bureaucratic secrecy, and they argued in favour of a re-
view process which would be more open and therefore, as they saw it,
legitimate and democratic, regardless of its results. 91 The crux of the
matter was, as one critic said, that "as it stands, FIRA wields arbitrary
authority. 92
87 Ibid. at 18.
" Cited in Blanchette, ed., Canadian Foreign Policy 1966-76: Selected Speeches and Docu-
inents (1980) at 92.
89 Paquet, "The Regulatory Process and Economic Performance" in Doern, ed., The Regula-
tory Process in Canada (1978) at 56-57.
90 More realistic students of Canadian Public Administration, on the other hand, rightly
point out that the Cabinet should never have burdened itself with the time-consuming and rela-
tively trivial task of monitoring literally hundreds of new FDI applications. For a critical (and
more elaborate evaluation of FIRA's role as a regulatory "slave" of the Cabinet, refer to the study
of Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15.
91 See, e.g., Donaldson & Jackson, The Foreign Investment Review Act: An Analysis of the
Legislation (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev. 2 at 234; Reuber, supra note 20 at 249; Calvet & Crener,
supra note 17 at 422.
92 Reuber, ibid. at 249.
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The crucial questions, however, are: who were the beneficiaries
and who were the "losers" in this exercise of arbitrary power? More-
over, did the secrecy serve to cover up regulatory activities which were
so harsh as to be unfair to the continentalist interests, or did it becloud
the kind of regulatory futility which, if known to the general public,
would have cost the politicians the goodwill, and therefore ultimately
the vote, of the nationalist public? It was often said that the former
was the case and that behind FIRA's closed doors ruthless regulators
committed unspeakable regulatory atrocities. Nothing, however, could
have been further from the truth. The degree of regulatory efficiency of
an agency is directly related to the openness of its administrative struc-
ture and the opportunities it creates for public participation. Since
openness is believed to lead to regulatory action in the public interest,94
and since the public interest at the time of FIRA's inception was per-
ceived as the nationalist interest, it is very likely that the government
opted for a closed process precisely because it did not intend to serve
the public interest. Moreover, the desire to cultivate its ties with the
continentalist interest groups logically inspired the government's deter-
mination to keep the public's nose out of FIRA's affairs. FIRA was
thus an ideal tool for catering to special interests rather than to the
public interest, as one economist explained:
FIRA is essentially a political agency, with final accountability to cabinet. Given
its minimal public-reporting obligation (or opportunities), FIRA is susceptible to
being used to foster political objectives or "special interests". 95
Had the Cabinet wanted to regulate efficiently (in order to serve the
public interest), then procedural secrecy was clearly dysfunctional. But
if the Cabinet wanted to avoid regulating efficiently (in order to cater
to private interests), then the lack of procedural openness was perfectly
functional. Assuming that the Cabinet's decision to opt for a closed
process was not purely coincidental, we can conclude that the "veil of
secrecy", which was used to shroud the Agency's operations, did in fact
serve the interests of those powerful groups which the Trudeau govern-
ment knew to be adamantly opposed to the efficient regulation of FDI.
In the name of confidentiality, FDI regulation thus became a matter
which could be settled discreetly entre amis, between the reasonable
investor and an understanding government, far from the madding
crowd, so to speak, of economic nationalists. 6
93 Sabatier, supra note 59 at 430-31.
" Ibid. at 430.
95 Globerman, supra note 48 at 74.
" Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 120-21, likewise argue that investors bene-
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That some proponents of continentalism and free trade failed to
understand the rationale of in camera regulation and wrongly sus-
pected that their interests were being sacrificed behind FIRA's closed
doors was naturally a source of great disappointment to the politicians
and to the Agency's personnel. A former FIRA commissioner, for ex-
ample, was to lament frequently that the Agency's good intentions were
not "understood" by "individual businessmen" (the commissioner
clearly took for granted that most businesspeople did understand them)
and that "the issue of confidentiality versus disclosure of information"
needlessly remained "a particularly vexing issue" for which unfortu-
nately there was no "easy, painless solution. ' 97 Indeed, the obvious so-
lution for this particular problem would have been to open FIRA's
doors and to reveal the Agency as the regulatory masquerade it had
been from the start. However, since that would have invited electoral
retribution from the nationalist public, it was politically more rational
for FIRA's political sovereigns to ignore the ignorant complaints of a
handful of businesspeople who failed to understand the true function of
FIRA's secrecy.
C. FIRA's Benevolent Regulators
When FIRA embarked on its regulatory career, it did so under
auspices which were particularly favourable not for the nationalist in-
terest but for the forces of continentalism and free trade. The latter
realized only too well that a much more efficient instrument could have
been chosen. They also valued FIRA's extremely limited range of ac-
tion and were reassured by the Agency's dependence on a Cabinet
which they knew to be responsive to their needs. As well, most of them
soon sensed that FIRA's procedural secrecy served not to promote but
to inhibit efficient FDI regulation. In the FIRA administrators, more-
over, they discovered benevolent and reasonable officials, like-minded
colleagues who proved to be keenly attuned to the needs and even
wants of foreign visitors and Canadian businesspeople alike.
The lack of regulatory fervour of the Agency's staff struck many
observers. According to Rugman, for example, FIRA officials "oper-
ate[d] in a very favourable manner towards proposed foreign direct in-
vestments." They did not administer the Act in a restrictive manner
". .. [nor] offer a substantial barrier to trade in capital", and they
fit from "the confidentiality that surrounds both the assessment and negotiating process and the
outcomes [of FIRA procedures]".
97 Howarth, "Personal Notes on the Review Process" (1977) 1 For. Inv. Rev. 1.
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were "willing to approve the great majority of [proposed] takeovers." 98
FIRA officials were particularly notorious for their generosity in inter-
preting "significant benefit to Canada"; as well, they seemed overly ea-
ger to restrict their Agency's already very limited jurisdiction by a
broad interpretation of "relatedness".99 The "significant benefit [to
Canada]" test is thus said to have functioned in reality as a mere "no
detriment" test.100 "Surtout pas trop de z le" - above all not too
much (regulatory) zeal - might well have been the motto of the ad-
ministrators of the Foreign Investment Review Act.
Among the factors which shape the attitude of officials of any reg-
ulatory agency and thus help to determine its level of regulatory "ag-
gressiveness", is the administrators' "orientation" towards the regu-
lated parties; by "actively soliciting the input" of the latter, regulatory
futility is allegedly promoted.101 But a former FIRA commissioner,
Gorse Howarth, went on record as "very much" welcoming
... a tendency ... for [foreign] investors to contact the Agency at an earlier
stage, in a preliminary and less formal way []... to discuss their plans and the
manner in which their plans can be most advantageously explained and described
in a formal notice .... 102
He made it clear that it was an integral part of the officials' duties "to
assist investors . . . to make the best possible case for allowance."10 3 In
addition, since FIRA had to operate in what an economist described as
"an environment of imperfect information", the Agency had to "often
go to outside experts for technical guidance. °10 4 This "information
gap" created opportunities for the regulated parties to provide their
own input into the screening process, which was, of course, to their own
advantage. It played a particularly important role in the negotiation
sessions during which FIRA officials were supposed to wrest conces-
sions and commitments from the foreign investors but actually de-
pended on the latter for much vital information.110 Thus, foreign inves-
tors and Canadian continentalist businesspeople openly scoffed at the
"commitments" which were supposedly obtained by FIRA and which,
98 Rugman, supra note 11 at 134, 145.
99 The legal stipulation that new foreign investments which could be shown to be "related" in
some way to existing ones were exempted from screening by FIRA.
100 Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 60; see also Abdel-Malek & Sarkar, An
Analysis of the Effects of Phase II Guidelines of the Foreign Investment Review Act (1977)
C.P.P.
101 Sabatier, supra note 59 at 439.
102 Howarth, supra note 97 [emphasis added].
103 Ibid.
104 Globerman, supra note 48 at 73-74.
105 McMillan, supra note 9 at 251-52; Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 422.
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incidentally, were frequently cited to demonstrate the alleged regula-
tory efficiency of the Agency.106 For example, a German guidebook on
investing in Canada stated flatly that "those commitments are usually
such that the applicant would have made them even without FIRA's
intervention."'1 7 As a Canadian executive, following a sale of real es-
tate which was supposed to create Canadian job opportunities,
commented:
It was a straight real estate deal. . . .What do they think is going to happen
after a deal of this sort? Do they really believe two more cleaners or janitors will
be hired just to comply with their need for commitments?' 8
That the traditional laws of business, and not some hypothetical com-
mitments or regulatory requirements, would continue to determine the
role of FDI in Canada was approvingly affirmed in The Financial Post,
which quoted an unnamed "Ontario official" as follows:
You can have all the undertakings you want, but market conditions will dictate
the [foreign] company's action in Canada.109
The benevolence of FIRA officials towards foreign investors and
Canadian continentalists was likewise reflected in their unimpressive
performance of their compliance duties. Even when certain "commit-
ments" were wrested from foreign investors, the Agency seldom both-
ered to follow up on its decisions in order to ensure that the promised
benefits did indeed accrue to Canada. °10 The fact that FIRA claimed
to send forms to the concerned companies each year, asking for their
"comments" on specific commitments, was unimpressive, as the regula-
tors were relying exclusively on information provided by the regulated
party. In any event, it was only when non-compliance with original
promises was actually admitted that the Agency proceeded to "verify
the reasons submitted.""' This "verification" was hardly a terrifying
ordeal for the foreign investor who was subjected to it. Whatever else it
may have involved, it did not even include such an elementary step as
"question[ing] the accuracy of information provided by the compa-
nies", as the Agency's own director of compliance acknowledged on one
occasion." 2 Moreover, the foreign-owned firm was obviously able to
100 See, e.g. Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 431.
107 Jansen & Matern, Kapitalanlagen in Kanada: Land mit Zukunft (1980) at 44.
108 Cited in Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Politics & Public Affairs (1976) at
415.
109 Best, "FIRA and Renault in Tough Scrap", The Financial Post (9 May 1981).
110 See, e.g., Saywell, supra note 108 at 415.
I" Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 430.
112 Ibid. at 430-31; also Lukasiewics, "FIRA: Damned often, Praised seldom", The Globe &
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draw on a vast repertoire of excuses and alibis.
Clearly, such "compliance" procedures virtually ensured that no
foreign investment proposal would ever retroactively be disallowed for
non-fulfillment of the commitments it was supposed to involve. Indeed,
it was a public secret that "no company has ever been convicted for
failure to comply with undertakings under the Act."113
If FIRA officials ever displayed any zeal at all, it appears to have
been in the promotion rather than in the restriction of FDI. Anyone
who has read the articles in the Agency's glossy magazine, Foreign In-
vestment Review, knows that it might easily be mistaken - or, as some
would argue, correctly identified - as a periodical advocating invest-
ment in Canada and advising foreigners how to go about it. As one
commentator has remarked, "under the guidance of some of its more
anti-nationalist ministers. . . [FIRA] even became an agency to solicit
rather than screen new foreign direct investment. 11 4 It is not unrea-
sonable, therefore, to conclude that FIRA revealed itself to be a "fun-
nel" rather than a "screen" for FDI.11 5
Some representatives of the continentalist interest were astute
enough - or sufficiently well-informed - to realize from the start that
FIRA was a harmless, and in some ways even a useful, regulatory crea-
ture. Others failed to see through the FIRA facade and to recognize
the Agency's officials as the genuine friends of foreign investment
which they undoubtedly were. As far as the majority of Canadian con-
tinentalists and foreign investors were concerned, however, although
Mail (I1 Aug. 1979).
11 Lukasiewics, ibid. Even when faced with the hard evidence of unfulfilled commitments,
FIRA has allegedly tended to be "too ready to forgive broken promises", see Saunders, "Con-
tinentalism and Economic Nationalisrnm in the Manufacturing Sector: Seeking Middle Ground"
(1982) 8 C.P.P. at 466. Former FIRA Commissioner Richardson has recently confirmed that no
foreign investor has ever been prosecuted, let alone punished, by FIRA, for failure to fulfill its
commitments: "Mr. Richardson said a defaulting company could be taken to court, but he could
not recall it ever happening", see "FIRA head warms Tone in Pitch to Executives", The Globe &
Mail 6 Feb. 1984. Some spectacular cases of (unpunished) non-fulfillment of commitments made
to FIRA are described in "Case Histories lift FIRA's Veil of Secrecy", The Globe & Mail (11
Aug. 1979).
14 Clarkson, supra note 42 at 86.
11, See Clement, supra note 81 at 238: "Rather than a 'screen' [FIRA] has become a 'fun-
nel' for foreign direct investment"; undoubtedly inspired by Miliband's observations about the
class origins of civil servants in the "capitalist state", Clement, a neco-Marxist sociologist, seeks to
explain the benevolence of FIRA officials towards their corporate "constituents" in terms of their
social origins and connections, and he suggests (admittedly on the basis of only one example) that
FIRA has been staffed - or at least managed - by people who are "perceived as 'safe' by...
[the] corporate elite", see Clement, ibid. at 238-39. Information made available about Richard-
son, a former FIRA commissioner, and statements made by him, appear to confirm Clement's
thesis; see, e.g., Goar, "FIRA Heir is used to taking care of Business", The Sunday Star (3 Oct.
1982); Lewington, "FIRA's Chief will soften Investor Rules", The Globe & Mail (29 Nov. 1982).
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they were originally rather perturbed by the creation of FIRA, they
eventually recognized the Agency as a regulatory "paper tiger" from
which they had nothing to fear. This took a "breaking-in" period of a
few years, during which they were discreetly enlightened by the gov-
ernment about the Agency's true function and effectively reassured by
its actual performance.
Members of the Canadian real estate industry, for example, who
were initially convinced that they would lose many foreign customers,
quickly learned that such pessimism was totally unwarranted. 110 Pre-
mier William Davis of Ontario in September 1977 probably accurately
reflected the opinion of the Canadian business community in general
with regard to FIRA when he stated that "[he did not] think that
FIRA now represents the inhibitions that it did two years ago [and
that] businessmen [he had] talked to don't find it a problem. 11 7 As for
foreign investors, particularly Americans, the influential American bus-
iness weekly Barron's, a tenor in the original chorus of protest and in-
dignation, was soon to write with a mixture of satisfaction and con-
tempt that "the only foreign company that wouldn't be welcomed in
Canada is Murder Inc." 18 American government officials had also ex-
pressed great misgivings at the time of FIRA's creation; they too were
to change their tune drastically after a few years.119 German investors
likewise expressed relief and satisfaction with FIRA's performance at
an early stage.12 0 The reason why Canadian and international propo-
nents of free trade achieved a comfortable modus vivendi with FIRA
so quickly was that one or two years of experience with the Agency
were more than sufficient to demonstrate that FIRA was a regulatory
body which did precious little regulating.
That foreign investors viewed FIRA procedures as a mere formal-
ity of which the outcome was not normally in doubt is illustrated rather
effectively by the following event. Having convinced itself that its plans
were "of substantial benefit to Canada . . .[and having been] advised
by its [legal] counsel [that] it had a good application and would not
have any trouble getting approval," an American clothing store started
operations throughout Ontario without awaiting FIRA's decision. In
doing so, the company's president stated that he "really did not think
"I See, e.g., McFadyen, "The Control of Foreign Ownership of Canadian Real Estate"
(1976) 1 C.P.P.
117 From The Globe & Mail (27 Sept. 1977), as cited in Globerman, supra note 42 at 84.
118 Cited in Gwyn, supra note 4 at 304.
"I See, e.g., the comments of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and of the U.S. Am-
bassador to Canada, cited in Clarkson, supra note 42 at 86-87.
120 Saywell, supra note 108 at 316.
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the company was taking much of a risk," that he was "not into gam-
bling". FIRA officials admittedly disallowed the proposal, but they has-
tened to declare that the company's actions, although somewhat "un-
usual", were not illegal, and they graciously permitted the clothing
store to submit a second application. Its Ontario subsidiaries, mean-
while, were allowed to continue their operations. (The company's sec-
ond application, incidentally, received FIRA's customary approval a
few weeks later.)' 2' This event is by no means unique122 and illustrates
the magnitude of the confidence foreign investors could afford to dis-
play, and display with impunity, in their dealings with an agency which
was supposed to be the stern guardian angel of Canada's economic
autonomy.
V. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF A VOTE-MAXI-
MIZING INSTRUMENT
A. FIRA's Flexibility
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Trudeau lived up to
the unspoken commitment he had made at the time of FIRA's estab-
lishment to the Canadian forces of free trade in general and to the
continentalist faction in business and finance in particular. In spite of
all the nationalist rhetoric, FIRA regulated minimally; the little it did
was done very ineffectively. Existing and "related" FDI - the heavy
artillery of foreign capital in Canada - was (and remained) safely out
of the Agency's reach and, since the creation of FIRA had silenced the
earlier talk of taxation and other efficient instruments, found itself ac-
tually more securely entrenched than ever before. Only new FDI above
a certain "threshold" of assets was subjected to a "screening" process
which hardly proved to be a regulatory baptism of fire. The judgment
of observers who believed that efficient (that is, restrictive) regulation
was intended from the start, or who would personally have preferred to
have seen efficient regulatory activities carried out, was devastating. "It
is questionable whether FIRA is operating as a barrier to foreign in-
vestment at all," wrote Rugman. 123 Referring to the fact that Canada
121 "Health-Tex gambles on FIRA, ends up in Bureaucratic Limbo", The Globe & Mail (28
Sept. 1983). Predictably, Health-Tex did not remain in "bureaucratic limbo" very long; its second
application to FIRA received the seal of approval as early as 13 Oct. 1983, as a FIRA informa-
tion officer confirmed by telephone on 14 Nov. 1984.
222 See, e.g., the case of a "U.S. based computer company [which] set up shop in Canada 18
months before it gained FIRA approval to do so; the first application was disallowed by the Cabi-
net . . . but a second application was accepted after six months", see "Case Histories lift FIRA's
Veil of Secrecy", The Globe & Mail (11 July 1979).
123 Rugman, supra note 11 at 140.
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continued to have "the highest level of foreign control of any industrial-
ized country in the world," a political pundit remarked cynically:
Nothing that we attempted has altered this pattern. The establishment of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency in 1974 has done little but enable bureau-
crats to place their official stamp of approval on the process. It has not signifi-
cantly changed the picture of foreign ownership in our country.
12
4
Furthermore, a Sunday Star editorial dismissed allegations that FIRA
discouraged FDI, stating emphatically that "the contrary can be
shown".
1 2 5
Although these remarks were all basically quite correct, the unher-
oic FIRA saga is not yet complete. The overriding reason why FIRA
was selected as the instrument for the regulation of FDI was that the
Agency could be relied on not to regulate, or at least not to regulate
effectively, while creating the appearance of regulation. In doing so,
Trudeau achieved the dream of every rational politician to satisfy both
public opinion and powerful interest groups. With one regulatory stroke
of genius he had satisfied the nationalists as well as the continentalists.
Moreover, FIRA offered Trudeau opportunities for subsequent and
more extravagant "vote-maximizing" achievements. The Agency's for-
mat as that of a regulatory "slave" of the Cabinet opened up unlimited
prospects for "discretionary enforcement" of the FDI legislation. Thus,
the Trudeau Cabinet created for itself the means to engage, according
to the needs of the place and the time, in the "high-visibility enforce-
ment" of the regulatory legislation or in the "low-visibility moderation"
of its effects,126 that is, to regulate when and where it was politically
rational to do so and not to regulate in converse situations.2 7
The picture painted here, presenting FIRA as an inefficient regu-
latory scarecrow, must therefore be modified somewhat, since it is clear
that, under certain circumstances, the Agency was quite capable of effi-
cient regulation. A good example is the publishing industry. This sector
of Canadian capitalism, which plays an important role in the formation
of public opinion, had found a home in the nationalist camp and had
clamoured loudly for FDI controls. The flexibility built into the screen-
124 Desbarats, supra note 66 at 53-54.
125 "FIRA's Work is Vital", supra note 67.
126 Trebilcock et aL, supra note 2 at 88-89; see also Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra
note 15 at 112-13.
17 Trudeau may have learned this lesson from a careful reading of the Gray Report which,
at 336, had suggested that a screening agency would allow dealing with FDI "on a case-by-case
basis" and that "the vigour with which a review process is applied can be made to vary over
time".
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ing Agency permitted Trudeau to have FIRA take energetic action in
this politically sensitive field. The results, according to a detailed Globe
and Mail report, were highly beneficial to Canadian authors and pub-
lishers, who were even said to have gained a more solid foothold in the
U.S. market as a result of the Agency's efforts on their behalf.1 28 What
the Globe did not say, of course, was that FIRA managed to regulate
efficiently in this case because it was to Trudeau's political advantage
that it did so.
This example also illustrates, incidentally, how FIRA's "high-visi-
bility enforcement" capabilities enabled the Liberal government to im-
press the nationalist public from time to time with real regulatory
achievements in the FDI field and thus to sustain its image of commit-
ment to economic nationalism and "Canadianization". Most of the
time, however, the flexibility of the screening instrument was manipu-
lated for the purpose of "low-visibility moderation" of the FDI legisla-
tion, primarily to preserve the peace between the government and the
powerful continentalist interest groups. FIRA's "discretionary enforce-
ment" achievements in the various provinces strikingly illustrates this
point. Efficient FDI regulation was not unwelcome in Ontario, a fully
developed province widely thought to be saturated with foreign capi-
tal 129 and the heartland of economic nationalism, so that FIRA could
regularly be given the green light for a few disallowances of foreign
investments proposed for that member of confederation. However, most
if not all other provinces needed and wanted whatever capital they
could raise in the international money market in order to develop their
industries and were originally very suspicious about FIRA's inten-
tions.130 To ensure, therefore, that FIRA would not offend regional sen-
sibilities, provincial governments were allowed to participate actively in
the Agency's business. An expert in the field explained:
The Agency must take into consideration, inter alia, industrial and economic
policy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province
likely to be significantly affected [by the proposed investment]. 13 1
For all intents and purposes, then, provincial wishes were FIRA's com-
mand,3 2 with the result that the Agency's administrative practice
128 Johnson, supra note 7. See also Godfrey, supra note 77 for a typical FIRA decision which
"delighted" Canadian book publishers.
M-' See, e.g., the statistics in "Indicators of Foreign Control of Non-Financial Industries by
Province" in FIRA Paper No. 3 (1978) at 112.
130 Schultz, Federalism, supra note 83 at 59-61; Hayden & Burns, supra note 42 at 422;
House of Commons Debates (4 July 1972).
13, Schultz, supra note 84 at 60; see also Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 24.
12 See, e.g., the statements of the former FIRA commissioner in Howarth, supra note 97;
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served virtually to repeal the FDI legislation in the many provinces
which favoured unrestricted access to international investment capital.
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that, after an uneasy but short
"breaking-in period . . . [FIRA's] performance seem[ed] to have dis-
armed its [provincial] critics." 133 In due course, in fact, provincial sus-
picion of FIRA is said to have given way to appreciation and even af-
fection for this federal regulatory "ugly duckling". As one authoritative
commentator put it:
From the provincial perspective, both in its composition and its operation,.
[FIRA] is in many ways one face of a model intergovernmental regulatory rela-
tionship. The level of trust and mutual cooperation that has been generated...
is, to say the least, highly encouraging.
134
This provincial goodwill, of course, was bought at a price - the "un-
dermining of the Agency's [regulatory] responsibilities.' 3 However,
this was a price the Trudeau government considered a bargain and paid
gladly in order to avoid politically costly conflict with the provinces. In
any event, FIRA's accommodating attitude vis-A-vis provincial govern-
ments clearly shows that this admirably flexible screening agency could
be - and often was - used very effectively for the purpose of "low-
visibility moderation" of the relevant FDI legislation wherever or
whenever Ottawa was confronted with powerful interests opposed to
real restrictions on FDI.
B. An Affront to Continentalist Feelings
Although the continentalists were undoubtedly very relieved that a
mere "screening agency" had resulted from the national debate over
FDI and that FIRA's performance had made it possible for them to
achieve a modus vivendi with the Agency at an early stage, they were
not entirely happy with FIRA. The Agency's existence may not have
hurt their basic interests, but it certainly hurt their feelings. Many in-
vestors thus felt that the Foreign Investment Review Act made a take-
over suspicious per se and stigmatized the foreign acquisitor with "a
presumption of wrongdoing".136 To advocates of unfettered laissez-faire
capitalism, FIRA also symbolized statism, dirigisme and even social-
according to Schultz, Swedlove & Swinton, supra note 15 at 55, "in over 97% of resolved cases
the final decision to allow or disallow a particular transaction was in agreement with the opinion
expressed by the province or provinces consulted".
iss Schultz, Federalism, supra note 84 at 59.
Ibid. at 61.
13s Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 422.
136 Ibid. at 423.
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ism. The fact that the NDP was one of FIRA's earliest proponents
unquestionably reinforced the Agency's image as a symbol of "socialis-
tic" policy. The Financial Post and other advocates of Canadian capi-
talism thus loudly condemned the Trudeau government's "socialistic"
manipulation of the flow of international capital; 137 the Canadian Man-
ufacturers' Association and the Canadian Bar Association protested
what they perceived to be a violation of the basic right to hold prop-
erty, of "the right of Canadians to dispose of their holdings as they see
fit." 138 One right-wing commentator actually described FIRA as a cog
in the machinery of Trudeau's alleged "grand design of a Socialist
Canada." 139 Similarly, although FIRA did not prevent American capi-
tal from continuing to take full advantage of investment opportunities
in Canada, it did serve as a symbolic warning that Americans did not
enjoy an unlimited right to invest in this country. Consequently, al-
though American investors (and their government) learned to live with
FIRA, they never ceased to resent the Agency's existence, not for what
it did, but for what it symbolized, namely the desire for greater Cana-
dian economic independence.1 40 Among Canadian continentalists and
foreign investors, then, FIRA unquestionably caused a great deal of
alienation or, in the language of Public Choice, the Agency saddled
them with "disaffection costs".1 41
Secondly, Canadian proponents of laissez-faire, as well as foreign
investors, believed that the creation of FIRA was responsible for more
tangible costs, such as the "transition costs" involved in learning to
deal with a new actor on the regulatory scene. 42 FIRA's cumbersome
and lengthy procedures were another major source of complaint in this
respect, as was the alleged (but largely mythical) uncertainty of the
outcome. 43 Business interests (and many economists) thus argued that
the alleged costs, risks and frustrations of dealing with FIRA resulted
in serious economic distortions. Potential foreign investors were said to
117 See, e.g. Resnick, supra note 4 at 167.
"a McMillan, supra note 9 at 246; Resnick, supra note 4 at 167; see also Clement, supra
note 81 at 237-38, for a neo-Marxist comment on the reaction of "the dominant capitalists in
Canada".
13' McCready, Profile Canada: Social and Economic Projections (1977) at 244.
140 A Globe & Mail reporter thus emphasizes that FIRA served "as a symbolic warning [to
the Americans] that Canada isn't open season for all, no matter what the conditions", see Martin,
"Cozying-up to Reagan full of Pitfalls for Mulroney", The Globe & Mail (25 Sept. 1984).
141 Terminology from Quinn & Trebilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory
Change [1982] U.T.L.J. at 152.
142 Ibid. at 117.
'11 See, e.g., Donaldson & Jackson, supra note 90 at 234, Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at
422; Lukasiewics, supra note 112; Langford, supra note 75 at 18.
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be discouraged from pursuing their plans, and "Canadian holders of
wealth" were allegedly forced "to sell their assets at a reduced price"
on account of the perceived diminished demand for these assets.144 The
point was even made that these distortions produced higher costs of
production and therefore, in the end, higher prices for Canadian
consumers.
145
Summarizing these grievances, it might be said that, as a policy
instrument chosen by rational politicians, FIRA undeniably had certain
disadvantages. However, these were far outweighed by the Agency's
many advantages. Moreover, the importance - from the viewpoint of
political rationality - of these disadvantages should not be overesti-
mated. If it is true, for example, as some economists claim, that
FIRA's byzantine procedures resulted in higher prices for consumers, it
is also true that such costs were so dispersed that they were unlikely to
be perceived by these same consumers. As for the "disaffection" and
"transition costs", they too were quite dispersed and, in the case of
foreign investors at least, they hit the pocketbooks of foreigners who
were unable-to retaliate electorally. The fact that not all continentalists
or, for that matter, all nationalists were entirely happy with FIRA's
existence or performance was really of relatively little consequence to
the politicians who had created the Agency for their own "vote-maxi-
mizing" purposes. However, it is important to keep in mind that certain
grievances did exist as they will provide a better understanding of the
objectives of those who, taking advantage of important changes in the
economy and in public opinion, launched an offensive against FIRA in
the early 1980s.
VI. CONCLUSION: FIRA IN CONTINENTALIST TIMES
Towards the end of the 1970s Canada's economy slid into a reces-
sion from which it has not yet fully recovered. Moreover, due to factors
such as the sluggishness of the world economy as a whole - certainly
not as a result of FIRA activities - the formerly abundant flow of
foreign capital declined considerably.1, This came at a time when the
need to develop Canadian mineral resources generated an unprece-
dented demand for investment capital, a demand which the domestic
capital market was allegedly unable to meet. 47 Economic nationalism
"' Quote from Reuber, supra note 20 at 250; also see Migu6, supra note 22 at 13-14;
Globerman, supra note 48 at 75, 95.
'I' Migu6, supra note 22 at 29, 48.
146 See, e.g. Calvet & Crener, supra note 17 at 436.
147 Ibid. at 433.
[VOL. 23 NO. I
FIRA
was increasingly viewed as a luxury Canadians could not (or could no
longer) afford. Issues other than foreign ownership, such as unemploy-
ment and inflation, commanded a higher priority. Opinion polls re-
flected the changing trend in public opinion and concluded that
"Canadians do not rank [foreign ownership] as such an important issue
as unemployment, inflation, and other economic problems."' 14 8 Eco-
nomic nationalism lost its former popularity and, consequently, was
more effectively ridiculed as "national myopia" and unaffordable
"xenophobic nationalism".,4 9 Foreign investment controls, in particular,
were singled out as "obnoxious disincentives to investment" and one of
the causes of the recession.150 Conversely, free trade and continentalism
were viewed by growing numbers of Canadians as the only strategy
which offered any hope of economic improvement. "Continentalism",
writes Trudeau's biographer, became "the new chic".1 51 "Greater con-
tinental economic integration" in general, and unrestricted access to
Canadian markets for American capital in particular, were advocated
as cures for the country's economic problems. There was nothing new
about this, but what mattered to the politicians was that, at that time,
the gospel of laissez-faire and continentalism was not restricted to spe-
cial interest groups but enjoyed mass appeal.1 52
Although FIRA had never been a genuine regulatory threat, the
Agency's mere existence (as opposed to its performance) was a thorn in
the side of the proponents of free trade. Foreign investors, Canadian
businesspeople and their lawyers had put up with the admittedly minor
yet still irritating "disaffection" and "uncertainty costs" associated
with FIRA procedures, but now that public opinion appeared to be on
their side they probably asked themselves why they had to put up with
anything. Precisely when the anti-FIRA forces moved to the offensive
is difficult to say, but in retrospect the election of Ronald Reagan late
in 1980 was probably an important milestone in this respect. American
investors and Canadian continentalists alike must have realized that
they would be able to count on the active support of a president who
had been elected on a platform of economic neo-conservatism and who
was determined to clear the world's markets of all obstacles - even
symbolic ones, such as FIRA - to the free international flows of capi-
148 Rugman, supra note 11 at 127.
149 Laxer, supra note 5 at 41.
10 Ibid. at 39-40.
'" Gwyn, supra note 4 at 304.
'12 Laxer, supra note 5 at 21.
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tal.153 In any event, following the 1980 election of Reagan, Ottawa
found itself under pressure to relax its FDI policies. 154
It has been remarked that the Trudeau government "de-fanged"
FIRA once it had become clear that continentalism was gaining popu-
larity.' 55 However, since FIRA had never had "fangs", Trudeau could
introduce only purely cosmetic changes which purported to placate the
continentalists (as well as the Americans) symbolically.56 Among these
symbolic gestures were the demotion of "high-profile" nationalists in a
1982 Cabinet shuffle (which, inter alia, caused Herb Gray to be
divested of the post of Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and
thus of the stewardship of FIRA), 57 the appointment of a new com-
missioner, Robert Richardson (who publicly declared that "he under-
stood the businessman's point of view"), 158 efforts to demystify FIRA's
modus operandi, to shorten procedures and to "soften investor rules" in
general;15 9 and, finally, the inevitable announcement that the issue of
FIRA's role would be studied by all sorts of experts.60
All these measures were purely cosmetic. The appointment of offi-
cials whose benevolence to business was widely publicized, for example,
was unlikely to make much difference since FIRA administrators had
been benevolent regulators from the start. Disclosing more information
was irrelevant as far as the results of FIRA procedures were concerned,
as secrecy had covered up the benevolence of the regulators. While
openness might have demonstrated this, more disclosure could have
done little to increase this benevolence. A few statistics may illustrate
this point: in 1982, the first year of "openness", FIRA approved 92
percent of all proposals; this was certainly an impressive figure, but not
much more than the 86.9 percent of 1981 and the 89.3 percent of
1980.'6' The promise of "softer investor rules" sounded fine, but
153 Clarkson, supra note 42 at 84.
'5 See, e.g., "Ottawa quietly debating Changes for FIRA", The Globe & Mail (20 Nov.
1982). For a good example of corporate pressure on the government, see Gulf Canada's "sugges-
tion" with regard to FIRA in ads in both Time and The Globe & Mail during 3-10 Oct. 1983.
16" Clarkson, supra note 42 at 84.
156 It is true, on the other hand, that Trudeau did shelve plans, announced during the 1981
election campaign, i.e. when nationalism was still believed to be fashionable, to put more teeth
into the Foreign Investment Review legislation.
15 Clarkson, supra note 42 at 105-106; "Canada: Facing a Winter of Discontent", Time (8
Nov. 1982).
158 Goar, supra note 115.
159 Lewington, supra note 115; see also "Administrative Changes Under FIRAct" (1982) 6
For. Inv. Rev. I.
160 "Lumley Seeking Advice on FIRA', The Globe & Mail (5 Apr. 1983).
261 "Only 8%. . .", supra note 77. These figures are attributed to FIRA sources, but differ
from those cited in the Appendix, which are also based on figures provided in FIRA publications.
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FIRA's investor rules, having always been very soft, could hardly be
made much softer.
Continentalists undoubtedly derived some satisfaction from these
symbolic gestures,"6 2 but passionate arguments against FIRA continued
to be heard. Why, then, did Trudeau not simply abolish the Agency?
At a time when foreign investment was seen as the sine qua non of
economic recovery, the elimination of what was perceived as an obsta-
cle to FDI would certainly have seemed to make sense economically.
The answer is that, for a number of reasons, it was not politically ra-
tional for Trudeau to abolish FIRA.
First, abolishing FIRA would have been tantamount to acknowl-
edging a serious past mistake, something which would have entailed
significant political costs.' 6 3 Such a step would have amounted to an
unspoken admission that the opposition was correct when it contended
that earlier government policies had caused the recession. Second, Tru-
deau must have wondered whether nationalism could be written off for
good. Although battered, it continued to be a force in the land, and the
possibility that it might stage a comeback some day could not be ruled
out. Since the continentalists and free traders had found a home in the
Progressive Conservative Party, Trudeau must especially'have wished
to avoid burning the bridges that led to the remaining strongholds of
economic nationalism, lest he be marooned in an ideological no man's
land. Had he decided to do away with the Agency, he would certainly
have antagonized the nationalists, many of whom viewed FIRA as a
"sacred cow". 64 Third, FIRA continued to be politically useful to the
Trudeau Cabinet which, it must be remembered, controlled the Agency
directly and was therefore able to regulate or to avoid regulating, de-
pending on which option was politically most useful. Now that con-
tinentalism was in vogue, FIRA's flexibility made it possible for Tru-
deau to engage in the "high-visibility moderation" and "low-visibility
enforcement" (as opposed to the earlier "low-visibility moderation" and
"high-visibility enforcement") of the Foreign Investment Review legis-
lation; this enabled him to please the continentalist interest groups and
the now more continentalist-oriented public without doing what he
would certainly have done had he dissolved FIRA, namely, incurring
the wrath of those individuals and interest groups who remained un-
162 Favourable continentalist reactions are described in Valpy, "FIRA, Remade?", The
Globe & Mail (9 Nov. 1982), and Lewington, supra note 115.
163 Quinn & Trebilcock, supra note 141 at 130.
164 A Sunday Star editorial (27 Feb. 1983) sternly warned, as its title had it, that "FIRA's
Work is Vital".
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abatedly nationalist.
As an instrument for the efficient regulation of FDI, FIRA had
been virtually worthless from the start. From the viewpoint of technical
efficiency, therefore, there was no reason to keep the Agency alive
when, during the last few years of Trudeau's career as Prime Minister,
continentalism was sweeping the land and even purely symbolic regula-
tory constraints of FDI no longer appeared desirable or even afforda-
ble. However, FIRA had always been primarily a cog, an invaluable
cog even, in the "vote-maximizing calculus" of its political sovereigns.
This usefulness for political purposes ensured the Agency's survival, re-
gardless of whether nationalism or continentalism was in the ascendant,
until Trudeau's retirement from politics.
POSTSCRIPT: "INVESTMENT CANADA", BRIAN MULRO-
NEY'S FIRA?
Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government, elected in
September 1984, has recently replaced FIRA with "Investment Can-
ada". This new Agency will continue to screen FDI, but its powers will
be even more limited than FIRA's had ever been because foreign in-
vestment in new business ventures (as opposed to takeovers of existing
businesses) will no longer be subjected to the screening process. More-
over, whereas FIRA supposedly approved only those proposals which
were deemed to be of "significant benefit to Canada", "Investment
Canada" will be satisfied if an investment merely promises a "net bene-
fit" to the country. 165
The Mulroney government apparently expects that this change
will convince the world that Canada is once again "open for business".
However, it remains to be seen whether foreign investors will respond
as enthusiastically as the new Prime Minister hopes. As some New
York investment bankers were quick to point out, FIRA had never de-
terred foreigners from taking advantage of investment opportunities in
Canada so that the Agency's demise is, by itself, unlikely to "bring
them back".16 8 It can be argued, moreover, that FIRA has not really
been laid to rest, but has merely been "changed" into "Investment
Canada"; in any event, the latter will still perform at least some of the
"screening" duties to which foreign investors had supposedly objected
ae Investment Canada Act, S.C. 1985, c.20; Walkom, "Foreign Investors Welcome as Tories
Lowering Barriers", The Globe & Mail (8 Dec. 1984).
"' Walkom, "Bankers see no Flood of Foreign Capital: Softer FIRA and NEP have Little
Impact", The Globe & Mail (20 Dec. 1984); Little, "Replacing FIRA may not attract Investors",
The Globe & Mail (17 Jan. 1985).
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in the past.
This raises the question whether the Mulroney government, which
purports "to encourage investment in Canada by . . . non-Canadi-
ans", 167 made the technically most efficient policy decision for that pur-
pose when it replaced FIRA with "Investment Canada". It clearly did
not, because foreign investors - to the extent that their plans are influ-
enced by Canadian government policies at all (an increasingly ques-
tionable premise) - would undoubtedly have been even more en-
couraged had FIRA been totally abolished. The reasons for not doing
so are related to Mulroney's "vote-maximizing calculus".
Firstly, Mulroney undoubtedly realized, as Trudeau did before
him, that eliminating a FIRA-type body would have been politically
risky, since nationalism has continued to be a force in the land despite
its setbacks of recent years. Had he dissolved FIRA altogether, Mulro-
ney would have pleased foreign investors and Canadian continentalists,
but he would certainly also have antagonized the nationalists. By
changing FIRA into "Investment Canada", he managed to please the
former without antagonizing the latter (or, at least, not too much). The
Tory government undoubtedly hopes that the continentalists will view
"Investment Canada" as an agency which aims to promote FDI, and
that the nationalists will view it as a policy instrument which, like
FIRA, will inhibit FDI. Secondly, "Investment Canada" is to inherit
the admirable flexibility which had been built into FIRA, allowing
Mulroney to prevent foreign takeovers whenever and wherever it will
be politically useful (or even indispensible) for him to do so. The an-
nouncement that "culturally sensitive" industries will continue to enjoy
special protection reflects Mulroney's desire not to alienate influential
nationalist private interests such as the publishing industry; with the
establishment of "Investment Canada" he has created for himself the
means to do so.
FIRA symbolized the regulation of FDI in nationalist times. How-
ever, in reality it did very little regulating (or,if it did, did so very se-
lectively) because it served first and foremost as a cog in the machinery
of Pierre Trudeau's "vote-maximizing calculus." In this respect, and
only in this respect, FIRA was a very successful instrument. "Invest-
ment Canada" is supposed to symbolize the deregulation of FDI in
neo-conservative, continentalist times, but it is clear that this Agency,
too, must be understood primarily as a "vote-maximizing" tool in the
hands of Brian Mulroney. Whether "Investment Canada" will be as
167 Investment Canada.
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successful in this respect as its predecessor remains to be seen.
APPENDIX: PROPOSALS ALLOWED BY FIRA, 1974-1983











1983 (first two quarters)
Sources: Foreign Investment Review, vol. 2, no 2, spring 1979, pp. 30-31, and vol. 5, no 2, spring
1982, pp. 34-35; also FIRA, "Quarterly Statistics," October-December 1982 and April-June
1983.
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